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Purpose: This article analyses the most critical financial participation programs (FPP) in 
Poland to show the relationship between the programs applied and the socio-economic results 
of enterprises and assesses the impact of participation on these results and the impact of 
selected factors because of the introduction of FPP. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The research has been based on a questionnaire answered 
by senior management of listed Polish companies with at least one out of three significant 
FPPs in operation, namely share ownership, profit-sharing, or a stock option scheme.  
Findings: The results of the empirical study conducted by the authors indicate some peculiar 
relationships. The vast majority of schemes in Polish public companies are aimed at the 
participation of the management personnel, these programs are narrow-based (only for 
management) and somewhat hermetic, with a high concentration of stocks or shares in the 
hands of the management. 
Practical Implications: FPPs generally have a positive influence on enterprise functioning. 
However, the effects are more social than economic (no significant economic improvement 
after program implementation). 
Originality/Value: The paper contributes to the debate about financial participation and 
suggests actions to popularise these programs worldwide. 
 
Keywords: Worker ownership, financial participation, profit sharing, stock option, worker 
attitude. 
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1.    Introduction 
 
In recent years, complex studies have been carried out considering the impact of 
financial participation programs (FPP), such as employee ownership (EO) or profit-
sharing, on the economic performance of European companies. They suggested that 
financial participation impacts the economic performance of companies (Mathieu, 
2009). Moreover, it has been officially acknowledged that FPPs are following state 
policy (in the European Union in general) because they have a positive influence on 
efficiency and employment and accelerate the fulfilment of other goals of state policy, 
such as the redistribution of wealth or broader participation in creating welfare and 
overcoming in-company conflicts (Fakhfakh and Pérotin, 2002). The mechanism of 
the relationship may be the participation in shares or profits subliminally which leads 
to increased willingness and involvement and better work performance, which 
contributes to the company's success. To some extent, the employees become more 
connected with the company, which helps to increase profits. 
 
Finding convincing arguments and clear evidence about the schemes and their 
effectiveness is troublesome for companies that want to implement FPPs (Pendleton, 
1997; Robinson and Wilson, 2001). The commonly shared belief is that companies 
want to motivate their staff to work better and more efficiently and convince them to 
stay with the company through the implementation of participatory solutions. 
However, evidence suggests that in companies operating FPPs, work efficiency does 
not radically change (Pérotin and Robinson, 2002). Therefore, it can be assumed that 
this is not a direct reason for their implementation, and the schemes are simply part 
of a set of employee participation tools (Jirjahn, 2002; Kato, 2002; Long, 2002). 
 
A study conducted in over 20 EU countries, comprising several thousand enterprises, 
shows that FPPs had a positive or at least neutral impact on efficiency (Mathieu, 
2017). The achieved results favour participation in profit sharing having a more 
substantial influence on work efficiency than the influence arising from employee 
share ownership (Braam and Poutsma, 2010; Kruse and Blasi, 1997). This might 
result from differences in the conditions in which the schemes are implemented, 
which in turn makes it difficult to measure the absolute effects achieved in different 
studies in various countries.  
 
Most studies show that the implementation of participation ownership solutions (and 
employee profit-sharing schemes) has positive effects. An example might be the 
analyses conducted by Kaarsemaker (2006), in which he showed that among the 70 
papers he studied, there was evidence in 48 of them that schemes based on employee 
participation in ownership had a positive influence on the financial results of 
companies, but only in 6 were their negative relationships. Similar conclusions drawn 
by other authors dealing with this topic—especially solutions based on employee 
ownership—can be found in the summarising work by Kruse and Blasi (1997), for 
example. These researchers claim no automatic or direct relationship between 
employee ownership and economic indicators such as productivity. A significant 
number of studies point to better or similar results achieved after the introduction of 




participatory solutions. However, there is only sporadic information in the literature 
presenting negative relationships between employee participation in financial 
schemes and economic results (Kruse and Blasi, 1997). 
 
This study focused on analysing FPPs in Polish-listed companies to increase 
knowledge on the subject and demonstrate the relationships between the programs 
applied and the socio-economic effects for enterprises. Given the shortage of 
literature concerning FPPs, this article tries to increase both understanding of and 
interest in this topic. Some crucial characteristic features of the applied forms of FPP 
were also identified. We focussed on the management approach because FPPs did not 
cover most regular employees. 
 
We examined a sample of large, listed companies whose market capitalization was 
200 million euros or more. Some were privatized and domestic, while the rest were 
foreign private firms. One could therefore expect some significant remainders of 
employee ownership after the privatization process. 
 
2.    General Background and the Situation in Poland 
 
Participation schemes based on company profits and employee share ownership are 
popular in the European Union. In the four largest countries (France, the UK, 
Germany, and Spain), these schemes have covered around 17 million workers (19% 
employees from the private sector). This may be due to earlier experience and 
traditions with blue-collar worker ownership in France and the UK or cooperatives in 
Spain. The most popular financial programs are, profit-sharing and share ownership 
in France, varieties of profit-sharing in the UK and share ownership in Germany. 
Countries with a significant number of FPPs are Italy, France, Ireland, Spain, and 
Austria; post-Soviet states have a less significant number (Mathieu, 2013). 
 
It should be noted that from the national point of view, only some types of FPPs are 
preferred, mainly those considered to be suitable for contributing to the achievement 
of macroeconomic goals. Activities promoting the implementation of participatory 
solutions are conducted in different countries in a varied manner and with diverse 
intensities; therefore, one should bear in mind that their spread in particular countries 
will differ. Nevertheless, there is a constant, yet non-dynamic, growth in the number 
of employees taking part in FPPs. Research conducted in the EU and US provides us 
with information about these schemes and their achieved results. For example,  
 
Caramelli (2010) found that not only does EO affect performance, but corporate 
performance positively affects the development of EO through employee ownership 
preferences, profit- and gain-sharing bonuses, and employee stock offerings 
(Caramelli, 2010), another study that used longitudinal panel data showed positive 
effects of FPP on longer-term performances (Fakhfakh and Pérotin, 2000). Robinson 
and Wilson (2006) found that the combination of profit sharing and share plans is 
positively related to higher efficiency than companies with no plans. Other 
researchers stated that employee financial participation had played a marginal role in 
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the new EU member states, whereas some employee share ownership is found in most 
countries today, profit-sharing is almost non-existent. Still, the potential beneficial 
effects of both forms of employee financial participation should not be neglected. For 
new EU member states, the beneficial effects could be even more critical than in the 
advanced EU economies for strengthening workers incentives, raising productivity, 
and improving overall enterprise efficiency (Hashi, Lowitzsch, Uvalić and Vaughan-
Whitehead, 2006).  
 
Another finding by the Freeman team was the lack of theoretical developments on 
EO mechanisms to corporate performance. Even after thirty years of research, we still 
do not know much about the mechanisms through which EO and other financial 
participation arrangement’s function "inside the black box" (Freeman, 2010). Karmi 
and others stated that whereas profit sharing is accompanied by other forms of 
participation, including indirect participation and employee involvement in plan 
management, companies with equity-based plans tend to be less participative in every 
respect. This is particularly pronounced in stock option plans (Kalmi, Pendleton, and 
Poutsma, 2004). Pendleton and Poutsma, for example, focus on policies of central 
employer organizations and their role in promoting, or impeding, financial 
participation measures and conclude that there are variations between countries in the 
preferred form of financial participation. Some unions prefer profit-sharing, whereas 
others tend to prefer share ownership schemes. The extent of union activity about 
financial participation is strongly influenced by the level of government activity in 
this area. Generally, where governments promote little activity in the promotion of 
financial participation, there is little activity on the part of unions (Pendleton and 
Poutsma, 2004). 
 
In Poland, it must be said that the restructuring program was characterized by critical 
incentives for employee participation, especially in firms transformed into so-called 
employee-owned companies. The ownership structure in these companies, in general, 
is relatively stable, and employees who do not hold any executive posts still control 
a substantial number of shares. Research conducted in the late 1990s showed that the 
average participation in ownership by employees who do not hold any executive posts 
decreased from 58.7% right after the privatization to 31.5% in 1999 (Lowitzsch, 
Hashi, and Woodward, 2009). The following years did not bring any improvements 
to the establishment of employee-owned companies. This was caused by, among 
other things, a lack of interest on the part of politicians and trade unions and 
legislation favouring investors from outside the company. 
 
The success of the significant restructuring changes in the Polish economy mainly 
depended on the effectiveness of the reforms concerning the restructuring of 
ownership in all sectors. This required a new approach to the concept of private 
property and defining the new role and place of employees during the ongoing 
changes. Employee-owned companies were formed due to direct privatization—so-
called liquidation—when the enterprise's equity was handed over for use with the 
right to repurchase by most employees of the established company (Bogdanowicz-




Bindert, and Czekaj, 1997). Before this privatization, it was necessary to convince 
employees to purchase shares.  
 
One should keep in mind that this method was effective for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which did not require the tremendous financial outlays necessary for the 
privatization of larger companies (Ministry of the Treasury, 2009). Therefore, it can 
be stated that the conditions for introducing new solutions aimed at increasing the 
share of employees in ownership or participation in other financial schemes are not 
very favourable. One can even formulate a thesis that among workers in Polish 
companies, especially those holding lower posts, a subliminal barrier exists that 
hinders the process of further ownership changes or even the introduction of new 
forms of economic democracy aimed at developing a new type of responsibility for 
the company. Overcoming this barrier may be possible only after some time, when 
the employee, already being an owner, begins to understand the economic gist of 
dividends and develops a habit of contemplating how to increase the value of the 
company, realizing that this, in turn, is directly reflected in the value of his or her 
shares of stock.  
 
The legal structure in Poland provides the opportunity to implement different forms 
of FPPs, including share ownership, profit sharing, and the creation of employee-
owned companies through transformation processes. However, politicians have not 
provided incentives for developing such schemes or given them proper support yet. 
The most widespread FPPs embrace share ownership and profit-sharing programs, 
although the latter is considered a broad-based scheme related to company results 
described in Poland as a "bonus," but it does not have a legal basis.  
 
Compared to other EU states, the situation in Poland does not appear optimistic, and 
the level of employee ownership in large enterprises is relatively low, as are the 
dynamics for this development. 
 
3.    Research Method and Research Question 
 
The study was based on an online survey sent via email. This is an optimal method 
due to the nature of the community analyzed, the situational context, and, most of all, 
the specificity of the issues examined. This method is based on respondents providing 
written answers. The drawback is the possibility of conducting the survey only among 
those who have access to the Internet. The elements for the sample were selected out 
of the listed companies that had at least one out of three major FPPs, namely shared 
ownership, profit sharing, or stock-option scheme. 
 
Respondents were provided with limited general information on who conducted the 
study and the study’s topic and purpose. Anonymity was guaranteed, especially if the 
subject was sensitive or required to provide internal company information. It was 
assumed that the questionnaire was completed by top managers or members of the 
management board. The survey form was divided into three parts and contained 51 
questions. The first part concerned company information, the second, information on 
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the FPPs, and the third, an assessment of employee participation in the FPP(s). A 
small number of questions were closed questions, while the others were multiple-
answer and multiple-choice questions. 
 
The survey was prepared based on numerous similar surveys used by international 
companies and organizations to study the same problems, i.e., Slovenian, and Dutch 
companies and CRANET data, yet their scope and analyses are broad-based. Two 
Slovenian surveys were adapted to prepare the survey for Polish companies: 
VPRAŠALNIK za MENEDŽERJE (the questionnaire for managerial staff) and 
VPRAŠALNIK za predstavnika SINDIKATA (the questionnaire for trade unions). 
Some questions and study problems were also taken from a Dutch report (Poutsma, 
2006).  
 
The study was conducted on a sample of Polish companies listed on the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange. The total number of companies covered by the analysis was 645. 
Companies that had at least one out of three major FPPs, namely shared ownership, 
profit sharing, or stock-option scheme, were chosen for the sample. To single out 
companies with financial participation programs, the companies were contacted to 
identify if they had any such programs. Finally, 121 companies were chosen, and 
questionnaires were sent via email. In many cases, the interviewers visited the 
company to help complete the survey. The survey was primarily conducted from 3 
November 2010 to 31 October 2011, although this was extended for some companies.  
Five people collected information; 28 companies did not return their surveys. Before 
starting the statistical analysis, those entities that provided incomplete data that 
amounted to more than 50% of the questionnaire were removed, analyses were based 
on the information collected from 73 companies (response rate 60%). Although the 
final sample size was 73, not all companies responded to all questions in many cases. 
 
The detailed analysis aims to answer the question. What type of personnel structure 
exerts the most influence on employee opinions concerning the effects of FPPs? Four 
groups of employees were included in this study, managerial, white-collar, blue-
collar, and administrative personnel. The predominance of one group over another 
yields different results according to social effects and raises additional questions: 
Does the date when an FPP has introduced influence employees’ opinions about the 
effects of implementing the program? What factors - barring or facilitating - 
determined the opinion of the employees covered by an FPP (making allowances for 
employee structure and the type of program)?  
 
A significant group of questions concerned the correlation between the percentage of 
managerial staff - or managerial staff and another group of personnel - in Polish 
companies covered by financial participation programs and aspects such as obtaining 
benefits, identification with the company, and types of implemented programs. 
Another question referred to defining factors that may influence the realization of 
each of the three programs, share/stock ownership, share/stock options, and profit-
sharing. The interactions have been classified as barriers, facilitation, and no effect. 
This paper also considers the effects of the introduction of all participation solutions. 




4.    Management Share in FPP: Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Levels and Types of Financial Participation 
 
This part focuses on the impact of selected factors on the introduction of FPPs and 
describes the level of the contingency coefficients, i.e., Pearson’s C and Kramer’s V, 
together with the accompanying levels of significance. The analysis divides the 
enterprises into three groups. The first group includes companies in which up to 25% 
of the managerial personnel took part in an FPP. The second group includes firms in 
which the share of the managerial staff ranges from 25-75%, and the third group 
includes firms in which an FPP covered at least 75% of the management. The 
relationships between the percentages of the managerial personnel covered by a 
scheme and their attitude towards their own company are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Relationship between the attachment of managers to the company with the 
number of managers covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 49, Kramer’s V = 0.806) 
Attachment to 
the company 
Managers covered by a stock/share ownership 
programme 
Total 
100–75% 75–25% 25–0% 
Very high 53.1 26.5 6.1 85.7 
High 0.0 0.0 14.3 14.3 
Total 53.1 26.5 20.4 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
A strong correlation was observed between the percentage of managerial personnel 
covered by a stock/share-ownership program and their attachment to the company. 
The higher the number of managerial staff participating in a stock/share ownership 
program, the stronger the bond with the company for which they work. This 
relationship is statistically significant.  Another point to be analysed was whether the 
year of program implementation impacted, i.e., if it created higher identification with 
the company and better relations among workers (Tables 2-3). A division into two 
periods was introduced - up to 2004 and from 2005 to 20113. 
 
Table 2. Relationship between the time of FPP implementation and identification with 
the firm (in percentage, N = 47, Pearson’s C = 0.335) 
Introduction 
of FPP 
Identification with the company 
(measured by stock/share ownership) Total 
Positive No effect Negative 
Up to 2004 47.0 21.0 0 68.0 
2005–2011 32.0 0.0 0 32.0 
Total 79.0 21.0 0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own creation.  
 
 
3The year 2004 was a breakthrough, because it was the halfway point for such programme 
activity in Polish companies. 
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A detailed analysis of using a share-ownership program indicated a significant 
relationship between the scheme and the time introduced in the company. In firms 
where the program was introduced after 2004, all respondents expressed a positive 
opinion about the scheme’s relationship (stock/share ownership) with their 
identification with the company. Among respondents with programs introduced up to 
2004, only 47% stated this, while others reported no relationship. 
 
Table 3. Relationship between the time of FPP implementation and the relations 
between employees4 (in percentage, N = 47, Pearson’s C = 0.367) 
Introduction of FPP Relations between employees 
Total 
Positive No effect Negative 
Up to 2004 21.3 23.4 23.4 68.1 
2005–2011 19.1 12.8 0.0 31.9 
Total 40.4 36.2 23.4 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own creation.  
 
The relationships between the employees in companies that implemented the FPP up 
to 2004 are evaluated heterogeneously by the respondents. This means that in 23.4% 
of the FPP firms introduced earlier, a negative influence on relations between 
employees was reported. This may stem from a disproportional distribution of the 
program among the employees. In firms that implemented a stock/share-ownership 
program after 2004, the situation looks completely different. In these companies, 
almost 20% of respondents indicated a positive relationship between the scheme and 
the relations among employees, while the others believed that relations did not 
change. This may indicate a specific improvement in the schemes that contribute to 
better relations between employees. Considering the frequently antagonistic relations 
between the management and other workers (mostly blue-collar), respondents were 
asked whether implementation of the scheme contributed to improving the relations 
between these groups of personnel (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Relationship between the time of FPP implementation and the relationship 




Relations between workers and management 
Total 
 Positive No effect Negative 
Up to 2004 23.4 (11) 6.4 (3) 38.3 (18) 68.1 
2005–2011 19.1 (9) 12.8 (6) 0 31.9 
Total 42.5 (20) 19.2 (9) 38.3 (18) 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own creation.  
 
The results suggest a moderately strong relationship between the time the FPP was 
launched and the relations between blue-collar workers and management. 
 
4Employees are all working members of an organisation. 




Respondents from firms with a program implementation after 2004 did not notice any 
negative impact of the scheme on the relations among blue-collar workers nor on the 
relations between these workers and the management. These differences were indeed 
noticed in the firms where a program was implemented earlier. More than half of the 
respondents (56.2%, 18/32) observed a negative influence of the FPP on the relations 
between blue-collar employees and management, and only one-third noticed a 
positive impact on the relations between them. Relations among employees in firms 
that introduced the FPP later seem to improve more strongly than companies where 
the schemes had been in operation for a longer time. This may seem surprising 
because firms with more significant experience in using participation programs 
should be characterized by a lower level of conflicts between these groups of 
personnel, but the study did not confirm this. Perhaps those mentioned above 
promotional and educational campaigns have made everyone aware that only mutual 
support and cooperation can contribute to the program's success. 
 
Analysis of the responses also showed mutual relationships between the percentage 
of the managerial personnel covered by a stock/share-ownership program and factors 
that may also affect the implementation and realization of the scheme. These factors 
include the level of employees' interest (Pearson's C = 0.541) and the level of owners' 
interest in a particular scheme (Pearson's C = 0.707). In firms where a stock/share 
ownership program covered over 75% of the management, all respondents claimed 
that the interest level of both employees and owners has a significant influence on the 
realization of the program itself (54% of all respondents in this group of managerial 
staff). Only in enterprises where less than 25% of the management participated in this 
ownership program did respondents think the level of interest on the part of owners 
hindered the realization of the scheme (15% of all respondents and 78% of companies 
in this group). Such a small percentage of managerial personnel participating in the 
program may result from low engagement from firm owners who are not interested 
in implementing such schemes and do not see any benefits to doing so. 
 
4.2 Factors Related to the Introduction of FPPs 
 
The analysis showed some significant correlations between the percentage of the 
management covered by a stock/share-ownership program and other factors that may 
affect its realization. The most crucial of them are displayed below (Tables 5-14). 
 
Table 5. Relationship between accountancy regulations and the number of managers 
covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.615) 
Management covered by 
a stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
Accountancy regulations affecting realisation 
of financial programmes  Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 0 29.15 25.0 54.15 
75–25% 16.7 6.25 4.15 27.1 
25–0% 0 4.15 14.6 18.75 
Total 16.7 39.55 43.75 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation.  
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Over 16% of respondents representing companies in which 25–75% of the 
management hold stock/shares think that accounting regulations facilitate the 
realization of the scheme. For more than 14% of the respondents in companies where 
less than 25% of the management participates in the scheme and for over 25% of 
respondents from firms where more than 75% of the management is covered by the 
scheme, accountancy regulations represent a barrier. 
 
Table 6. Relationship between administration/bureaucracy with the number of 
managers covered by a FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.746) 
Management covered 
by a stock/share 
ownership 
programme (in %) 
Administration/bureaucracy affecting 
realisation of FPPs programmes 
Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 0 54.15 0 54.15 
75–25% 16.7 10.4 0 27.1 
25–0% 0 4.15 14.6 18.75 
Total 16.7 68.7 14.6 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation.  
 
All respondents from firms in which over 75% of managerial staff take part in a share-
ownership program believe that this factor does not influence the realization of the 
program. Administration/bureaucracy is seen as a barrier by 14.6% of respondents 
from firms where less than 25% of managerial personnel are covered by the scheme 
and more than 16% of respondents representing companies in which 25–75% of 
managers participate in the scheme say that this factor makes the introduction of the 
program more accessible. 
 
Table 7. Relationship between the level of knowledge about the programmes and the 
number of managers covered by a FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.362) 
Management covered by 
a stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The level of knowledge about the programmes 
as a factor affecting realisation of FPPs  Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 0 (0) 35.42 (17) 18.75 (9) 54.17 
75–25% 0 (0) 20.83 (10) 6.25 (3) 27.08 
25–0% 0 (0) 4.17 (2) 14.58 (7) 18.75 
Total 0 (0) 60.42 (29) 39.58 (19) 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
This aspect was not mentioned as facilitating the realization of the program. Four in 
ten respondents think of this factor as a barrier to realizing the scheme (40.0%), while 
the highest percentage was observed in firms in which 75-100% of managers are 
covered by the scheme (18.75%). At the same time, 35.0% of companies in which 
75-100% of management take part in FPPs say the level of knowledge does not 
influence the program's implementation. This may be a group of companies in which 
the management has sufficient knowledge to administer these schemes, yet many 
representatives think the opposite. This opinion is crucial if one wants to adequately 




prepare the company to introduce the program and achieve the necessary level of 
knowledge. 
 
Table 8. Relationship between the level of political support/interest from the 
government with the number of managers covered by a FPP (in percentage, N = 48, 
Pearson’s C = 0.578) 
Management covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The level of political support/interest 
from the government as a factor 
affecting realisation of FPPs  
Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 0 35.42 (17) 18.75 (9) 54.17 
75–25% 16.66 (8) 4.17 (2) 6.25 (3) 27.08 
25–0% 4.17 (2) 14.58 (7) 0 (0) 18.75 
Total 20.83 (10) 54.17 (26) 25.00 (12) 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
Only respondents from companies with the highest percentage of management 
covered by the program consider this factor a barrier to program realization (35%; 
9/26), while almost two-thirds of this group believe that it does not have any influence 
on the introduction of the scheme. It can be assumed that the first group (75-100%) 
perceives the level of political interest as too low and, as such, treats this factor as a 
barrier hindering the implementation of schemes. 
 
Table 9. Relationship between the requirements on securities with the number of 
managers covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.466) 
Management covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The requirements on securities as a 
factor affecting realisation of FPPs  Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 18.75 10.4 25.0 54.15 
75–25% 6.25 16.65 4.15 27.05 
25–0% 0 4.2 14.6 18.8 
Total 25 31.25 43.75 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
Almost 44% of all people taking part in the survey believe that the requirements on 
securities are a barrier to the realization of a stock/share-ownership program and 25% 
consider this factor helpful. It is difficult to provide a reliable interpretation of so 
many sceptical answers because, in examining companies without foreign branches, 
this percentage should be lower. The smaller the number of managerial personnel 
participating in the schemes, the more negative are the opinions about the influence 
of this factor on program realization. 
 
Opinions vary on corporate culture (employees, values, environment) on the 
realization of FPPs. Although 68.8% of all the respondents treat this factor as 
facilitation, 16.66% of company representatives, 25-75% of the management are 
covered by the program, believe that corporate culture is an obstacle to fulfilling the 
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scheme. This factor is frequently mentioned by authors who work on, among other 
things, the conditions of implementing participation solutions as one of the significant 
determinants facilitating or inhibiting fulfilment of programs (Kulpińska, 1992; 
Hofstede 2000; Mendel, 2001). 
 
Table 10. Relationship between the corporate culture and the number of managers 
covered by a FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.597) 
Management covered by 
a stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The corporate culture as a factor 
affecting realisation of FPPs  Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 43.75 10.42 0 54.17 
75–25% 10.42 0 16.66 27.08 
25–0% 14.6 4.15 0 18.75 
Total 68.77 14.57 16.66 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
Table 11. Relationship between company structure and the number of managers 
covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.536) 
Management covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The company structure as a factor 
affecting realisation of FPPs  Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 43.75 (21) 10.42 (5) 0 54.17 
75–25% 10.42 (5) 16.66 (8) 0 27.08 
25–0% 0 18.75 (9) 0 18.75 
Total 54.17 45.83 0 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
Table 12. Relationship between market conditions and the number of managers 
covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 0.536) 
Management covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The market conditions as a factor 
affecting realisation of FPPs Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 43.75 (21) 10.42 (5) 0 54.17 
75–25% 10.42 (5) 16.66 (8) 0 27.08 
25–0% 0 18.75 (9) 0 18.75 
Total 54.17 45.83 0 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
More than half of respondents (54.2%, 26/48) believe that a proper company structure 
(particularly employment structure) may facilitate the realization of a stock/share-
ownership program, while other respondents do not see the influence of company 
structure on implementation of the program (45.8%). However, it is possible to notice 
regularity here: the higher the number of managerial personnel taking part in the 
schemes, the more managerial personnel perceived the structure of the company as a 
facilitating factor in the realization of the program, although this may also relate to 
personnel structure in the examined companies. 
 




Among firms with the highest percentage of management covered by the scheme, 
over 80% (21/26) declared that market conditions (competition, access to financial 
resources, government regulations, etc.) make the realization of an ownership scheme 
easier. There is a clear correlation: the more managerial personnel covered by the 
scheme, the higher the number expressing a favourable opinion of the influence of 
market conditions on fulfilling the program. 
 
Table 13. Relationship between cross-border harmonisation of systems and the 
number of managers covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 
0.398) 
Management covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The cross-border harmonisation of 
systems as a factor affecting 
realisation of FPPs  
Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 0.00 (0) 54.17 (26) 0.00 (0) 54.17 
75–25% 0.00 (0) 27.08 (13) 0.00 (0) 27.08 
25–0% 0.00 (0) 14.58 (7) 4.17 (2) 18.75 
Total 0.00 (0) 95.83 4.17 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
A little over 22% (2/9) of the representatives from firms in which an ownership 
program covered less than 25% of managerial staff, or every twenty-fifth person 
surveyed, consider cross-border harmonization of systems a barrier to fulfilling the 
scheme. The vast majority (95.8%; 46/48) of respondents regard this factor as 
unimportant for realizing the program. This should not be surprising considering the 
absence of branches in other countries. Interesting (though somewhat controversial) 
results were achieved when asking about the influence of legal regulations on the 
realization of ownership programs in companies. The previously mentioned lack of 
legislation and legal solutions regulating the preparation and implementation of 
financial participation programs may, on the one hand, act to facilitate, or on the other 
hand, become a significant barrier to their realization (Table 14). 
 
Table 14. Relationship between legal framework and the number of managers 
covered by an FPP (in percentage, N= 48, Pearson’s C = 0.746) 
Management covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
The legal framework as a factor affecting 
realisation of financial programmes  Total 
Facilitation No effect Barrier 
100–75% 0 54.2 (26) 0  54.2 
75–25% 16.7 (8) 10.4 (5) 0 27.1 
25–0% 0 4.1 (2) 14.6 (7) 18.7 
Total 16.7 68.7 14.6 100 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
The results indicate strong and significant correlations, all respondents from firms 
where a stock/share-ownership program covers more than 75% of the management 
declared that the legal framework does not affect the realization of the scheme.  
Factors Influencing the Implementation of Financial Participation Programmes  
in Polish Companies  
 
982 
However, 77.8% (7/9) of respondents in firms are seen as a barrier in firms where 
less than 25% of the managerial personnel take part in a program. Over 61% (8/13) 
of respondents representing companies in which 25-75% of top-level employees 
participate in the programs think that the legal framework facilitates the realization 
of the scheme. It is difficult to completely agree with this, bearing in mind the 
opinions above on the need to devise suitable regulations that will set out rules for 
the creation and implementation of financial participation programs and the resulting 
tax and insurance obligations.  
 
Companies with a low level of managerial personnel participating in these schemes 
probably encounter the most significant number of unfavourable circumstances, 
which prevent them from developing the program, and this may not necessarily relate 
to the legal framework. A high percentage of the management taking part in the 
programs may also stem from the dominant position of these employees in the 
personnel structure of the examined companies and the additional income from 
participation, which allows them to “ignore” other factors limiting the 
implementation of schemes while obtaining considerable benefits. 
 
Summarising the results of this section leads to some observations about the influence 
of factors on implementing FPP programs in Polish companies. Considering the 
division of firms into groups with a defined percentage of the management covered 
by participation programs, a significant discrepancy is evident in the answers 
obtained; therefore, the results are not entirely satisfactory and require additional 
questions to justify the choices made. 
 
4.3 Perceived Effects of Financial Participation 
 
In this paper, an attempt was made to analyse the correlations between the 
participation of managers in company ownership, the influence on financial results 
achieved by the firm, and the participation of different personnel groups covered by 
an FPP. It is possible to give an example showing the statistically significant 
relationships between the variables; thus, an analysis of the influence of an ownership 
program on the relationship between employees and the percentage of different 
personnel groups covered by the program is shown in Table 15. 
 
A strong correlation appears between managers and other groups of personnel who 
have stocks/shares in the company due to an FPP. The conditional frequencies show 
that those groups in which management personnel have 75–100% and 25–75% of 
stocks/shares believe that an FPP negatively affects the relationship between 
employees (83.3% and 9.1% of the companies in each group, respectively). The 
distribution of answers indicating positive influence and no influence were balanced. 
The fact that stock/share ownership exerts a positive influence on the relationship 
between employees was most often (93%) mentioned by people from firms in which 
the total workforce possessed 75–100% of stocks/shares, except blue-collar workers.  




Table 15. Opinions of the relationship between employees in the company in 
comparison to the percentage of different personnel groups covered by an ownership 
programme (in percentage; N=48, Kramer’s V = 0.783; Pearson’s C = 0.742) 
Management covered by a stock/share 
ownership programme (in %) 
The relations between employees 
Total 
Positive No effect Negative 
Only managerial personnel 75-100% 16.7 0 83.3 100.0 
All personnel (except blue-collar) – 
75-100% 
92.9 7.1 0 100.0 
Only managerial personnel 25-75% 27.3 63.6 9.1 100.0 
Only managerial personnel 0-25% 11.1 88.9 0 100.0 
Managerial personnel and white-
collar workers 
0 100.0 0 100.0 
Total - - - - 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
This indicates the following correlation. The more varied the personnel structure 
covered by the scheme, the more visible the influence this type of scheme has on 
interpersonal relations, according to the managers. However, it is astounding that 
there is a very high percentage of responses reporting the negative impact of programs 
on relationships between employees in companies where 75-100% of the 
management was covered by the program. When other employee groups view 
managerial personnel as a privileged group exclusively benefiting from the scheme's 
introduction, this exerts a negative influence on general relationships and attitudes in 
the enterprise. Despite different interpersonal relationships, FPPs were shown to be 
beneficial in identifying with the company, increased involvement, job satisfaction, 
or a higher sense of security (Table 16). 
 
Table 16. Relationship between opinions about selected job aspects in the company 
with the type of personnel covered by an FPP (in percentage, N = 48, Pearson’s C = 
0.459, Kramer’s V = 0.517) 
Personnel covered by a 
stock/share ownership 
programme (in %) 
Identification with the organisation through 
internal involvement, direct participation, job 
satisfaction and security 
Total 
Positive No effectc 
Only managerial personnel: 
75–100% 
20.83 (10) 4.17 (2) 25.0 
All personnel (except blue-
collar): 75–100%a 
16.66 (8) 12.5 (6) 29.16 
Only managerial personnel: 
25–75% 
4.17 (2) 18.75 (9) 22.92 
Only managerial personnel: 
0–25% 
12.5 (6) 6.25 (3) 18.75 
Managerial personnel and 
white-collar workers: 0–
25%b 
0.0 4.17 (2) 4.17 
Total 54.16 45.84 100.0 
a – managerial + white-collar (specialists) + administrative personnel 
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b – managerial + white-collar (specialists) personnel 
c – no negative effects reported. 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
There was a moderate correlation between personnel with stocks/shares in the 
company and their identification with the organization through increased inner 
involvement, direct participation, job satisfaction, and a sense of security as part of a 
stock/share-ownership program. The conditional frequencies indicate that 
respondents from most companies in which the management has 25-75% of 
stocks/shares, and all the representatives in companies where managerial personnel 
and other workers have 0-25% of stocks/shares, think that having stocks/shares does 
not affect broadly defined identification and job satisfaction.  
 
Lower participation of management in these groups probably had the most impact on 
the distribution of answers, which may also mean that many companies do not 
perceive such benefits. This could also result from insufficient preparation by firms 
when introducing participation programs, lack of information, the year of 
implementation, or other factors. It is not possible to grasp all the relationships and 
reasons for such answers. The percentage of company representatives who do not see 
any benefits (45.84%) is extremely high, which accords with the findings of an 
international study (Braam and Poutsma, 2010). A summary of the considerations of 
different aspects of efficient FPPs can be made based on an analysis of the answers 
displayed in Table 17. 
 
Table 17. Participation as a form of potential benefit for the national economy in 
comparison to the percentage of different personnel groups covered by a financial 
participation programme (in percentage, N = 42, Pearson’s C = 0.530, Kramer’s V 
= 0.773) 
Management covered by a stock/share 
ownership programme (in %) 
Do you find financial 
participation beneficial for 
the national economy? 
Total 
Yes No 
Only managerial personnel: 75–100% 28.6 0.0 28.6 
All personnel (except blue-collar): 
75–100% 
14.3 0.0 14.3 
Only managerial personnel: 25–75% 23.8 7.1 30.9 
Only managerial personnel: 0–25% 7.1 14.3 21.4 
Managerial personnel and white-
collar workers: 0–25% 
4.8 0.0 4.8 
Total 78.6 21.4 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own creation. 
 
There is a strong correlation between personnel holding company stocks/shares and 
an opinion as to whether financial participation programs are beneficial to the national 
economy. When managers possess many company shares, they perceive FPPs as 
beneficial for the national economy. However, when management has 0-25% and 25-




75% of stocks/shares, there are opposing opinions about the influence of participation 
programs on the national economy (14.3% and 7.1% of the surveyed people, 
respectively). These two groups stand for 21% of respondents who perceive some 
dangers stemming from the introduction of FPPs. 
 
5.    Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Having examined the practical programs and factors that influence their realization 
in companies, it must be noted that determinants of barriers in the introduction of 
FPPs include the level of knowledge about how to implement schemes in the 
company and accountancy regulations or lack of tax incentives (Bulcke, 2000; 
Postlethwaite, 2012; Poutsma, 2001;). Accountancy regulations are unclear or do not 
exist, and some managers are simply afraid of implementing an FPP because they do 
not know how to account for the shares, what taxes must be paid, how many years 
must pass before they can sell their shares and other shared concerns. However, some 
factors can make FPP realization easier, including tax incentives, employee interest, 
owner reactions (interest and decisions), company culture, and ownership structure. 
 
It must be noted that most highlighted factors that facilitate the realization of a scheme 
are external ones. Perhaps before introducing a program, the company should make 
the right choice to match both its goals and needs and then provide all personnel with 
proper training concerning the introduction and realization of the scheme (European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2010).  
 
Most programs were introduced in the first period (before 2004), which does not 
foster optimism for the future of participation programs in Polish companies. On the 
other hand, programs implemented after 2004 have had a more positive effect on the 
variables under investigation, which might have resulted from companies being better 
prepared for the introduction by more efficient informational and promotional 
campaigns. Therefore, it should be stressed that the availability of programs should 
be increased because it would lead to improved results from their use. According to 
the opinions mentioned in Table 16, this point of view is difficult to explain, but 
perhaps respondents consider the high expenditure of implementing such programs. 
However, to adequately consider this topic would require the use of a more profound 
focus on group interviews and a more comprehensive discussion.  
 
From this analysis of the structure, it appears that FPPs generally positively influence 
the functioning of the enterprise, but the effects are rather social. More rigorous 
statistical analysis carried out by the author did not yield satisfactory results, and 
questions remain that need to be answered, such as: Why do so few companies operate 
FPPs, and why are they not broad-based? This may be due to a management mentality 
problem, and the management is afraid of sharing power with blue-collar workers. 
Managers of Polish companies also seem not to think in a long-term perspective, and 
it takes time to convince the managers to introduce broad-based FPPs, which are 
much more efficient than other schemes. 
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The results of the present study do, to a large extent, agree with the findings of other 
studies conducted in other EU countries and the US (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi, 
2010). However, it ought to be stressed that it is necessary to draw appropriate 
conclusions allowing the preparation of a suitable political strategy to encourage 
different entities to apply participation solutions, both specifically for individual 
companies as well as more broadly defined conditions governing the implementation 
of these solutions in Polish companies, relying on the experience of foreign countries. 
Managers convinced there is a need to implement such programs should play a 
significant role, which at the same time, must relate to their belief in obtaining 
measurable benefits. What is also important: to convince other groups of employees 
to participate in an FPP or allow their participation? This requires changes in the 
modes of thinking of Polish managers, particularly in industrial relations and 
necessary revaluations. 
 
Because of the decrease in the number of companies with employee ownership as a 
proportion of the available number of privatized enterprises, among other factors, 
such changes may be challenging. It is not yet known whether the governmental 
support program of 20 October 2009 has changed anything. Some of the easily 
observable challenges include the absence of legal solutions promoting the creation 
and functioning of employee-owned companies (particularly concerning 
transnational companies) that can implement financial participation solutions; the 
lack of governmental support; the indifferent attitude toward new challenges in the 
economy; the worldwide tendencies in ownership changes; an absence of 
comprehensive solutions supporting the capital participation of employees in their 
enterprises; the absence of more detailed information on how employee-owned 
companies function in other countries; and the subsequent unwillingness to 
popularise this form of ownership and to introduce participation solutions. 
 
Polish company managers might be interested in broad-based share ownership in their 
firms, but the lack of a long tradition and negative experiences in the last few years 
do not guarantee the rapid development of employee share ownership in Poland. This 
might stem most employees' remote perspective on gaining profits—while the 
financial burden falls when particular forms of participation programs are first 
introduced—and from a too large discrepancy in shareholder goals in the enterprise. 
 
Considering the statistical compilation of materials, a sample including 73 companies 
is too small to provide plausible statistical results. These results could be a 
generalization of the statistical measurement values achieved on this basis about the 
population of enterprises in Poland that have introduced any form of FPP; structural 
indicators and contingency coefficients should also be considered for statistical 
values. 
 
This paper presented select views about the relationships between manager 
participation and the impact of other selected factors on the introduction of FPPs. 
After many years of conducting empirical studies on the benefits of implementing 
FPPs, the information provided by reports is insufficient to make a uniform decision 




about FPP's influence on company results. The findings are also hindered by the lack 
of clear-cut data about the extent to which implemented participation schemes 
contribute to the change of financial results. 
 
Studies conducted by the author do not convincingly explain the relationship between 
FPPs and results achieved by their implementation; this only proves a need for further 
study in this field. Further research following an empirical approach should 
concentrate on broad-based qualitative and quantitative research, which may yield 
correlations between FPPs and organizational indicators. Another conclusion that can 
be drawn is the necessity to conduct further, longitudinal research with a larger 
sample of companies, taking their business specificity and environment into account. 
The type of introduced FPP would also be essential to consider because this decision 
may influence future results. Research should begin well before introducing a 
scheme, as this would allow further evaluation of the influence of the given scheme 
on enterprise productivity. 
 
Employee financial participation programs are a research area for many environments 
and have been of great interest for economic empiricists for several years, yet with 
various intensities of studies conducted. As it may seem, this tendency is instead on 
the increase, which unfortunately is not reflected by the high growth of companies 
implementing the solutions above. This opinion may not correlate with opinions 
expressed by other people and international institutions, which think that a few-
percent annual increase in the number of firms with financial participation schemes 
will entail changes in awareness and organizational attitude, resulting in a spectacular 
implementation of these solutions. What fills with optimism is the initiative, 
enthusiasm, and actions taken in this area, yet without more widespread and properly 
run promotional activities, the implementation will take a long time.  
 
Studies which have been conducted on this subject are not only of a cognitive nature, 
but most of all, they are of an applicable character, and their purpose is to provide a 
diagnosis of the existing mechanisms for the implementation of the solutions 
mentioned above and preparing recommendations useful for further popularization of 
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